RECENT CASES
clause and the exercise of either is subject to the test of reasonableness. Maggs, The
Constitution and the Recovery Legislation: The R61es of Document, Doctrine and
Judges, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1934); but see 3 Law and Contemporary Problems
138 (1936).
Wills-Subsequent Conveyance as Revocation or Ademption where Testator Reacquires Property-[Illinois].-A testator devised generally all his real and personal
property to the defendant. Two years later, the testator conveyed the land here in
question to the defendant who subsequently reconveyed it to the testator. The testator died owning this land without republishing his will. In a suit for partition, his heirs
contended that the conveyance revoked the will as to this land, even though it was subsequently reacquired, and that it passed to them by descent. From a decree dismissing
the complaint, the heirs appealed. Held, affirmed. The conveyance did not impliedly
revoke the general devise where the testator later reacquired the property. Strang v.
Day, i99 N.E. 263 (Ill. 1935).
It was a familiar common law rule that after-acquired realty could not be devised.
Earl of Lincoln's Case, Freeman's Ch. R. 202 (1695); see Willis v. Watson, 5 Inl. 64
(1842). Thus, a conveyance of land already devised operated as a revocation of the
devise even though the testator reacquired the land. Marwood v. Turner,3 P. Win. 163
(1732); Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 258 (1823). As to personal property,
however, the common law was just the contrary; a sale of bequeathed personalty did
not work a revocation and if it was reacquired by the testator, it passed by the will.
Cogdell v. Cogdell, 3 S.C. Eq. 346 (18ii). The basis for the real property rule was removed by the Wills Act in England, and by similar legislation in the United States
permitting devises of after-acquired realty by making the will operate as of the testator's death, rather than as of the time of execution. I Vict., c. 26, § iii (1837); III. L.
1833, p. 315, Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. 148, § i; Bordwell, Statute Laws of
Wills, I4 Iowa L. Rev. 187 (1929). Accordingly, in most jurisdictions today a conveyance of realty as well as of personalty does not revoke the devise and the property,
if reacquired, will pass under the will. Woolery v. Woolery, 48 Ind. 523 (1874); Morey
v. Sohier, 63 N.H. 507, 3 Atl. 363 (i886); Gregg v. McMillan, 54 S.C. 378, 32 S.E. 447
(x889). Despite such legislation, however, Illinois has adopted the anomalous position
of permitting reacquired personal property to pass under the will (In re Austin, 243
Ill. App. 386 (1927)), but of retaining the common law rule as to specific devises of
realty. Phillippe v. Clevenger, 239 Ill. 117, 87 N.E. 858 (igog). It would seem that the
court in the latter case applied the technical common law rule of revocation to a situation for which it had been rendered inapplicable by statute. i Page, Wills § 467 (2d
ed. 1926); Costigan, Cases on Wills 363, note 42 (2d ed. J929). Had the conveyed
property never been reacquired, it of course would not have passed by the will, not because the conveyance had worked a revocation, but because the testator did not own
the property at his death. The failure of a devise or bequest because of the lack of such
ownership is, strictly speaking, known as ademption, not revocation. i Page, Wills
§ 456 (2d ed. 1926). There is confusion in the use of these terms, largely because under
either theory the result is the same if the property is not reacquired. 26 Mich. L. Rev.
124 (1927).

But nicety in expression is essential to avoid technical difficulties. Where

the property is reacquired, the theory of revocation requires a republishing of the will
to pass the property by the device; under ademption, however, the property passes by
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the will as though it had never been alienated. 2 Page, Wills § 1329 (2d ed. 1926).
The court in the principal case, although treating the problem as one of revocation,
reached a result which is in accord with the weight of authority. While the decision
covered only general devises, the court's language indicates that the authority of the
Clevenger case has been seriously weakened even as to special devises. The rationale
of the decisions can be reconciled only on the tenuous distinction that a subsequent
conveyance implies an intent to revoke a special devise of the property, whereas there
is no implied intention to revoke when the conveyance is of property which has been
generally devised.
Witnesses-Privileged Communication-Duty of Reporter to Disclose Name of
Informer-[New York].-The appellant, a reporter on the New York American, had
written an article concerning the "policy racket." A grand jury, then investigating
gambling and lotteries in New York, summoned the appellant as a witness. Upon his
refusal to disclose the names of persons mentioned in his article, he was adjudged
guilty of, and committed for, contempt of court. The appellant, seeking a writ of
habeas corpus, contended that the source of his information obtained as a reporter was
confidential and privileged. Held, the order dismissing the writ is affirmed; a newspaper reporter may not refuse to answer pertinent questions relating to confidential
communications. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, ig N.E. 415
(N.Y. 1936).
The proper decision of a particular case requires the disclosure of all relevant data.
A privilege from testifying will therefore be denied unless some strong reasons of public
policy (e.g., the desire to protect the confidential nature of a certain relationship) merit
more consideration than the desire to secure all the information in the individual case.
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (2d ed. 3923). The principal case is in line with the unanimous common law authority which regarded the policy arguments in favor of holding
privileged confidential communications to newspapermen as inferior to those calling
for the disclosure of all pertinent information. In re Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Hawaii 475
(1914); Ex pare Lawrence, r16 Cal. 298, 48 Pac. 124 (1897); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga.
242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (i911); Inye
Grunow, 84 N.J. L. 235, 85 Atl. ioii (1913). It has been argued, however, that in

making available the news necessary for the enlightenment of public opinion, especially as to matters involving the conduct of community and governmental affairs,
journalists perform a valuable service that should be encouraged. See 45 Yale L. J.
357, 36o (i935). Influenced by this feeling, four states have by statute changed the
orthodox rule so that *confidential communications to newspapermen are absolutely
privileged. Alabama (See New York Times, Jan. 8, 1936, p. 6); Calif. Stats. '935,
c. 532, § 6; Bagby's Md. Ann. Code 1924 c. 35, § 2; N.J. Acts. 1933, c. 167, § 2. But
see Governor Homer's veto of such a bill for Illinois. 68 Ed. & Pub. i8 (July 20, 1935).

The conflict between those who would deny all privileges and those who would grant
an absolute privilege to journalists might perhaps be resolved by the recognition of a
privilege similar to that accorded in government official and informer cases. A privilege
is there granted to encourage people to communicate to the proper officials whatever
information they may have concerning crimes in which the government is interested.
In the absence of a privilege protecting the informant's identity, the information would
not be volunteered because of the informant's fear that those against whom he had

